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Small Summers Island. Sommers Island: photo, internal structure

In July 1942, the command of the Baltic Fleet attempted to capture Sommers Island. The lack of necessary experience and lack of strength did not allow success then. For many years, the details of this landing were kept in the depths of the archive...

Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. The situation in the Baltic deteriorated again in the summer, when Soviet submarines began operating on enemy communications. However, their path from the Gulf of Finland ran past Sommers, a small rocky island*.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko. By the beginning of the war, he had the rank of vice admiral and was deputy people's commissar of the Navy, and participated in organizing the defense of Nikolaev and Odessa. On October 22, 1941, by decision of Headquarters G.I. Levchenko was appointed commander of the Crimean troops. But the battles that unfolded there were unsuccessful for the Soviet units, and on the night of November 16, the troops of the 51st Army left Kerch. On November 19, the post of commander of the Crimean troops was eliminated, and on December 1, Levchenko was arrested by the NKVD. On January 24, 1942, he was expelled from the CPSU (b), and on January 29 he was sentenced to 10 years with deprivation of all awards. But unlike many commanders whose fates were tragic, the admiral’s request for clemency on January 31 was granted. On February 2, he was reinstated in the party (albeit with a severe reprimand). And although the former deputy people's commissar was demoted to captain 1st rank, deprived of all awards and ordered to be used in a lower job, his criminal record was cleared. In March 1942, he headed the Leningrad naval base. He was appointed commander of the Kronstadt naval base on June 25, 1942. So Gordey Ivanovich desperately needed success, as they say...

Unfortunately, a number of miscalculations were made when developing the operation plan. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. In fact, the Finns had a garrison of 92 people on Sommers with twelve guns (of which two 75-mm, which were superior in power to the guns of Soviet boats, three 45-mm and seven 20-mm anti-aircraft guns), two 81-mm mortars, seven heavy and five light machine guns. To capture the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in men, the landing party was noticeably inferior to it in firepower.

The reconnaissance also failed to reveal the enemy’s defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The peculiarities of the island's coast were not taken into account, which led to tragedy - during the landing, the well-armed and equipped soldiers who left the boats often drowned under the weight of the ammunition. The interaction with aviation was also not worked out, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and communication between the paratroopers (as well as the sailors) and the pilots was not provided for at all.

July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was led by captain 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the diagram.

By the end of July 7, all forces intended for the operation were fully prepared, and at 23:33 the landing of troops and the loading of ammunition and special equipment began on Lavensaari. At 00:11 on July 8, the landing on the boats was completed, and two minutes later the ships began to enter the roadstead. At 00:30, the landing groups moved towards Sommers. Their transition was ensured by patrols, and from 00:35 - by four fighters. By one o'clock in the morning the covering detachment reached the target area. At the same time, from 00:40 to 00:59, 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, attacked the island in two waves from an altitude of 2300-4000 m. They bombed not very accurately - out of 120 100-kg bombs dropped, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by 2 raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, attacking from low altitudes in groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by 20-mm Oerlikon fire.

The plan for landing on Sommers Island

At 01:20, the landing groups turned around and went to the landing sites. The sea was relatively calm (swell up to three points), and visibility was simply excellent (oh, those white nights). At a considerable distance - 20-30 cables - the Finns discovered Soviet boats and opened fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 m and began the landing, which was completed within just five minutes. But at the same time, torpedo boat No. 152 and the “hunter” MO-110 were damaged.

Group II also had a hard time. Approaching the shore under fire, the sailors and paratroopers became convinced that the boats could not get close to it. Some of them had to repeat this several times, trying to find convenient landing spots under fire. When unloading the radio station, it either got wet or the batteries drowned and it could not work. The commander of the landing party refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 04:04 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade. The losses were growing - the hull of torpedo boat No. 62 was damaged, and the superstructure of the MO-402, the commander was killed, and 4 crew members were injured.

"Moshki" on patrol

III group was met with particularly intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and on TKA No. 121 the engines with the clutches turned on in forward stalled, and when starting the engines, it sat down on the rocks while moving. An attempt to save him after the landing was unsuccessful and he remained on the rocks. Fortunately, we managed to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of MO-413 from this group apparently showed indecisiveness and landed the fighters later than the others, and he needed an additional order from V.A. Salamatina.

But group IV found itself in the most difficult situation. Her ships were unable to suppress enemy firing points, encountering strong resistance. The commander made the decision to land the fighters at the point intended for the III group. But when the boats with the landing force began to go around, from the west, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 fell behind. It had to land the paratroopers “anyhow.” During the departure, it was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and its crew, under incessant shelling, transferred to torpedo boat No. 152. Torpedo boat No. 131 also suffered - its commander was killed, 3 paratroopers were killed and 4 were wounded.

In total, of the 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers ended up on the island, another 7 were injured on board the torpedo boat, and the patrol boat MO-402 did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned during the landing. It was also not possible to deliver some of the machine guns to the shore (apparently a large number, since sailing with the Maxims was simply unthinkable).

Torpedo boat with landing force

The Finns' reaction to the actions of the Soviet fleet turned out to be very quick and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Sommers garrison, all available forces were sent to its aid: the gunboats Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa, as well as 5 patrol boats. The first to arrive at the battlefield was the Uusimaa, which managed to repel the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then the Hämeenmaa and patrol boats arrived. During the battle with Finnish gunboats, torpedo boat No. 113 (commander - senior lieutenant A.I. Shumratov), which attacked the enemy together with boat No. 73, was killed. The sailors reported the sinking of one of the gunboats, but this information turned out to be unreliable.

Finnish gunboat "Uusimaa" (same type "Hämeenmaa")

During the battles at Sommers, messages that flocked to the headquarters of both sides contained, as a rule, greatly exaggerated information about the enemy’s losses, but for the Finns (who overestimated their successes by only two times!) this did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was sure that the enemy was suffering heavy damage and his ability to continue the fight was decreasing. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats received varying degrees of damage, not one of them was sunk.

At approximately 03.18, a prearranged signal was received from the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, which meant: “We have gained a foothold, please send a second echelon.” However, in response to Salamatin’s request, Levchenko responded half an hour late that the second echelon would be sent after occupying the island. And on Sommers there was a fierce battle. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Itapaya, all of whose guns were destroyed, and out of 26 defenders, only three managed to join their own. The rest were killed or wounded.

The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet planes carried out several attacks on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while fighters repelled raids by Finnish planes that carried out bombing attacks on support forces. During one of them, torpedo boat No. 33 from the covering detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat were also damaged.

Boat KM No. 911 puts up a smoke screen

Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, realizing that the battles were much more serious than planned, ordered the gunboat Kama to go to Sommers. Four torpedo boats and five patrol boats were sent to Lavensaari from Grafskaya and Battery Bays to reinforce the fighting forces.

In the morning hours of July 8, the activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats were running out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats, which provided great assistance to the island’s garrison, shot almost all of their ammunition. But the first of the German ships to take part in it, the minesweeper M 18, approached the battle site.

German minesweeper type M. “M 18” and “M 37” belonged to this type

At 08.48, the Soviet fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers, torpedo boat No. 22, which was trying to deliver ammunition to the paratroopers, caught fire and exploded from shell hits. By 11.30, the Finns managed to transfer a company to the gunboat "Turunmaa" and eight boats to help their garrison. consisting of 109 people. The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation; the Soviet landing force found itself in a difficult situation. Now the enemy side had not only firepower, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his gunboats supported their troops with fire from medium-caliber guns, while Soviet boats had only small-caliber guns. The Kama sent to Sommers was escorted by minesweeper boats, the speed of which with the installed trawls was very low. And although the Soviet coastal battery from Lavensaari entered the battle in the afternoon, its fire was not adjusted and was unlikely to bring much benefit to the paratroopers. The approaching Kama was forced to direct almost all its firepower against the Finnish ships.

At 14.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, which was part of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin, ordered the landing of the reserve in the amount of 57 machine gunners, loading of the radio station and food onto torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101. At about 16.00 they headed to Sommers and after about 45 minutes, under fire from Finnish ships, they approached its eastern shore and began landing soldiers and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that it happened during the day, everything was organized extremely poorly - again, as at night, the radio station was drowned, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, they managed to remove 23 wounded from the shore. From them it became known that there was a heavy battle on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy’s mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other soldiers on the shore. Already on the way out, torpedo boat No. 31 was hit and exploded.

Torpedo boat at the pier of Lavensaari island

It seems that the Soviet command was not preparing for serious battles for Sommerse and there were no units on Lavensaari that could be sent to help the landed units without the threat of weakening the defenses of the base itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing in a timely manner, and then it was too late - German and Finnish planes, ships, boats and guns of the island garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supplies, removal of the wounded, and then the evacuation of the surviving soldiers impossible.

By the evening of July 8, instead of the gunboat "Kama", on which both main caliber guns were out of action, the patrol ship (according to the Western classification - destroyer) "Storm" and base minesweepers (specially built ships with strong artillery armament) entered the battle. -205 "Gaff" and T-207 "Shpiel". But their help was clearly too late. By this time, the Finnish minelayers "Riilahti" and "Routsinsalmi", and German ships - the floating battery "SAT 28" ("Ost"), the floating base (tender) "Nettelbeck" and the minesweeper "M 37", which replaced its brother, approached Sommers. M 18", which suffered greatly from Soviet air raids. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times, he approached the shore at 500 m. Its crew decided to demonstrate to the Finns their “brotherhood in arms”: a strike force of 10 people formed on the ship was sent ashore, as well as several boxes with hand grenades, which the garrison needed.

Soviet base minesweepers

On the night of July 9, the Soviet command made a last attempt to correct the situation. Torpedo boats launched by the patrol boat "Burya" together with the minesweeper T-207 were launched to attack the enemy ships. Three boats managed to fire one torpedo each, but they did not reach their targets, and two boats were hit. An attempt to deliver ammunition to the island on three patrol boats also ended in failure. When hit by a shell, it exploded and died along with everyone on board, including the commander of the landing detachment, Captain 2nd Rank K.A. Shilov, MO-306. And although firefights between enemy ships continued all day, the position of the landing force on the island became hopeless. True, in the morning the pilots reported that they had torpedoed two enemy ships five miles north of Sommers, but this message was not true and could not change the situation. On July 9 at 12.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector radiogram reported to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, and the commander of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, about the situation in the area of the islands of Lavensaari and Sommers. The report said that there were no forces and means to continue the operation, and on Sommers itself there had been no hostilities since zero hours on July 9. At 19:20 G.I. Levchenko received a new message, which, in particular, said: “...No movement was detected on the island. If a landing force is detected, I will continue the capture operation.”

Soviet torpedo boats launch an attack

On the night of July 10, an attempt was made to deliver two scouts to Sommers, but the blockade of the island by enemy ships was too dense and Soviet boats were unable to approach it. Skirmishes between ships also did not bring results. The pilots again reported sunk and damaged ships, but this had no effect on the activity of the German-Finnish forces. In the afternoon, they again tried to organize a reconnaissance group landing on Sommers, but then postponed this operation for the night. At 01:00 on July 11, Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko, believing that the fighting on Sommers was over and trying to avoid new losses, decided to stop the operation.

In these battles, seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were lost. The base minesweeper was damaged, and the gunboat "Kama" was practically out of action due to technical faults - although one of the guns was able to be put into operation, the boat's steering failed and the steering was inactive for a long time and it had to be towed. On the first day of fighting alone, 10 torpedo, 5 patrol and 5 other types of boats were damaged.

But even this seemed not enough to the Finns, so they “included in the list of their victories” 8 ships and boats sunk by coastal artillery, the fleet reported 7 destroyed Soviet boats, and chalked up another gunboat (Volga) and 2 boats Finnish aviation. The Finns and Germans acknowledged damage to the minesweeper M 18, the gunboats Hämeenmaa and Turunmaa, and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army suffered 15 killed and 45 wounded, while the navy suffered 6 killed and 18 wounded. They estimated the Soviet losses in people as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and approximately another 200 people who drowned along with the lost ships. After the end of the fighting, the Finns covered Sommers with minefields and it remained under their control until Finland left the war in September 1944.

Although the operation to capture Sommers failed, it is unlikely that anyone today would dare to speak disrespectfully about the direct participants in the battles. Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the lack of provision of Soviet soldiers with special landing craft, the passivity of large ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ineffectiveness of the fire of coastal batteries, the Swiss historian J. Meister, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet Union, was forced to admit: “Russian landing units, although not numerous enough, as well as The crews of the torpedo boats fought very bravely, but they were unable to save the situation in this misguided operation."

* The length of the island is about 950 m, the width is about 450 m.
** So from June 1942 the Kronstadt naval base began to be officially called

Early in the morning, on the second day of our “cruise” through the “exotic” islands of the Gulf of Finland, we went to Sommers Island. Unlike Moshchny and Gogland, this island is small, rocky with a minimum of vegetation and many picturesque rocky bays.

There is also a lighthouse on the island, but it operates in automatic mode, that is, there is no keeper with it, and the Hydrographic Service, on whose ship we made our “cruise,” is in charge of maintaining and repairing the equipment. Next to the lighthouse there is a radio tower, built in 2005. It is equipped with expensive equipment for monitoring ships located throughout the entire water area of the Gulf of Finland, performing border security functions. There are motion sensors on the tower that react to someone approaching it closer than 30 meters, and send an instant signal to control centers in St. Petersburg and Peterhof, as well as to border guards. In general, the enemy will not even cross the borders of the Russian Federation under reliable guard!

Sommers Island went to Russia under the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, and in 1723 it was granted by Peter I to his jester Jan Lacoste. But after the death of the king, his jester could not prove his rights to the island (a ruble was attached to the letter of grant instead of a seal), and Sommers went to the treasury.

The lighthouse on the island was built back in 1808 and modernized in 1866. The lighthouse was destroyed during the Second World War and rebuilt in 1945.

There is also a recently abandoned border outpost on the island with a very decent training base

In December 1941, the Soviet garrison was evacuated from the island, and Sommers was soon occupied by the Finns. They fortified the island well, set up an observation post there, built a number of long-term firing points and a coastal battery for 75 and 45 mm guns. The pillboxes and gun yards have survived well to this day.

In the summer of 1942, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to recapture the island from the Finns by landing troops on it. The operation was prepared by the commander of the Kronstadt naval base, Captain 1st Rank I. Levchenko (former vice admiral, demoted to captain for the failure of the landing operation in Kerch).

And so, from the maneuver base of the Baltic Fleet on the island of Lavensaari (Powerful) on the night of July 8, 1942, 4 patrol boats and 7 torpedo boats left. With air support, the landing force began landing on Sommers around one in the morning. But there was no way for the ships to come close to the island, -

The paratroopers began landing by swimming, the Finns opened fire on them, discovering the landing in the light of the white summer night. During the shelling, about 70 paratroopers drowned before reaching the island. The Finns sent reinforcements to the island's garrison in the form of two gunboats and aircraft. A naval and air battle ensued near the island. The paratroopers who swam to the shore stormed the steep cliffs of Sommers under fire from Finnish bunkers and batteries. The head of the operation, I. Levchenko, having received a message about the landing of troops on the island, refused to send a second echelon of troops until the island was completely captured. Instead of helping the paratroopers who reached the island, he sent reinforcements in the form of 4 torpedo boats, 5 patrol boats and the gunboat Kama. But this did not help the soldiers storming the Finnish fortifications - approaching Sommers, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ships entered into battle with a detachment of German minesweepers who came to the aid of the Finns. By evening, both sides brought reinforcements to the island in the form of ships with infantry on board. The ships and aircraft of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet immediately entered into battle with enemy ships and aircraft and did not in any way influence what was happening on the island. But still, 57 machine gunners managed to swim to the island. During the assault on the fortified rocks, 13 of them were immediately killed. The Germans also managed to land a couple of dozen soldiers on the island. Dozens of Soviet paratroopers died under fire from Finnish bunkers. The fighting on and around Sommers Island continued until noon on July 10th. The Soviet landing force was destroyed.

In two days, 7 Soviet torpedo boats and one “small hunter” were sunk, 10 torpedo and 10 patrol boats and one base minesweeper were damaged. The Finnish-German fleet had few losses, and data on manpower losses vary greatly. Of the landing force that reached Sommers, only one person survived. The operation of the Baltic Fleet ended in nothing - the island remained with the Finns and was liberated by Soviet sailors only in 1944

The bays around Sommers are littered with the bones of Soviet sailors and the wreckage of German, Finnish and Soviet equipment. This is a haven for divers - lovers of military history. The artifacts they found from the last war replenished the collections of many military museums in the North-Western region of Russia.
We “stormed” the island along steep rocks, risking breaking our necks and having little idea how such an assault could be carried out under hurricane machine-gun and artillery fire from the enemy.

Honor and glory to the Soviet paratroopers who died a brave death on Sommers Island due to the stupidity and short-sightedness of the command of the Baltic Fleet!

To be continued...

There were episodes in the history of the Great Patriotic War, information about which was stored for many years in the depths of archives, inaccessible to the general public. Often this was evidence of mistakes made by the command during combat operations, which cost the lives of many soldiers. One of these operations, the landing on Sommers Island, a photo of which can be seen at the beginning of the article, was only recently covered in the press.

Fire barrier at the exit to the Baltic

In 1942, Soviet submarines intensified their activity in the Baltic Sea, causing significant damage to the Germans on their main communications. But the passage of submarines from the Gulf of Finland into the combat waters was hampered by the enemy garrison, whose location was the small Sommers Island. How to get to the central part of the Baltic, bypassing this area fraught with mortal danger, was a task that required an immediate solution.

A year before, a Soviet unit was based on the island, but, due to a short-sighted decision by the command, it was abandoned, which the Finns who fought on Hitler’s side immediately took advantage of. They placed there their garrison, consisting of ninety-two well-armed soldiers, brought in artillery pieces and built four strongholds of defense, thus turning the small island into

Demoted Admiral

The weather in the summer of 1942 was clear, which allowed the Finns to constantly conduct visual control of the surface of the bay and timely record the movements of Soviet submarines. The command of the Baltic Fleet decided to land troops on Sommers Island and take possession of it. The development of the landing plan was entrusted to captain first rank G.I. Levchenko, who had previously been demoted from admiral for abandoning Kerch.

To rehabilitate Levchenko, a successfully carried out military operation under his leadership was necessary, so organizing a military expedition to Sommers Island was very important for him, and he set about executing the order with all haste. But his haste failed him. In preparation for the capture of the island, many important factors were not taken into account, which subsequently played a fatal role.

Garrison guarding the island

Based on erroneous intelligence data, which they did not consider necessary to double-check, the developers proceeded from the fact that the garrison consisted of only seventy people, armed with two guns. As it turned out later, Sommers Island in the Gulf of Finland was defended by ninety-two people.

At their disposal were twelve guns (two of which were superior in caliber to the guns of Soviet boats), two large mortars, two anti-aircraft guns, as well as light and heavy machine guns. The Soviet landing force on Sommers Island outnumbered the enemies - two hundred and fifty people, armed with ten heavy machine guns, took part in the landing, but was significantly inferior to it in firepower.

Factors not taken into account when developing the plan

Intelligence failed to cope with its task. The data she transmitted did not give a complete picture of how Sommers Island was defended. The internal structure of the protective structures erected on it was not presented when developing the plan for the landing of paratroopers. This greatly complicated the situation for the paratroopers. In addition, the natural features that Sommers Island possessed were not taken into account.

Its internal geostructure is very complex. The broken coastline is a pile of rocks protruding from the water, the depth around which reaches five meters. Landing boats could not come close to land, and many soldiers, under the weight of their equipment, sank without ever reaching the shore. This led to a completely unnecessary loss of human life. Radio communication with aircraft supporting the landing from the air was also not ensured.

Landing ships going to sea

The operation began late in the evening of July 7, 1942. The ships with the marines left Lavensaari and headed for Sommers Island. The Gulf of Finland along their route was continuously monitored by a group of aircraft, whose duty was to warn the sailors in the event of an enemy appearance. At this time, Soviet bombers, accompanied by fighters, struck strike after strike on the island. They were replaced by attack aircraft, which carried out attacks from low altitudes. In response, the Finns opened powerful anti-aircraft fire.

In the unsteady light of the white night, the boats approached the island, and the landing began. It turned out that it was impossible to land on the rocky shore, and the boats repeated the attempt several times under enemy fire. During unloading, the radio was drowned, thus being left without radio communication. Before even setting foot on the island, the detachment suffered its first losses. Two boats were damaged by enemy fire.

Failed start of operation

The landing force landed on Sommers Island in several batches as the ships approached. The white night, glorified by poets, did the sailors a disservice. The surface of the bay was visible from a great distance, and every approaching boat was met by Finnish artillery fire. One of them, trying to escape enemy shells, ran into rocks. With great difficulty it was possible to remove the crew and weapons from it.

Others had to, suffering losses, land fighters in places not provided for by the previously drawn up plan. The beginning of the operation did not foretell a favorable outcome - of the two hundred and fifty-two participants in the operation, only one hundred and sixty-four landed on Sommers Island. The rest either died under enemy fire or drowned in the Baltic waves.

The Finnish command, having received a message about the attack by Soviet sailors, immediately sent significant reinforcements to help the island garrison. Two and five patrol boats were sent to the combat zone. On the way to the island, they began a battle with Soviet torpedo boats, which, having received damage, were unable to stop the enemy.

Capture of a Finnish stronghold and air battles

By this time, the paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds with which the Finns fortified Sommers Island. The bunker was captured, and as a result of a fierce battle, out of twenty-six defenders, only three remained alive. The rest were killed. According to the plan, at this stage the commander of the operation, Levchenko, was supposed to send them help, but, for unknown reasons, he did not do this, which put the attackers in a difficult situation.

By mid-day, active hostilities were taking place in the air. Soviet pilots carried out massive attacks on enemy positions and on their ships. Finnish aviation tried to attack the boats approaching the island, some of which received significant damage. As a result of air raids, ships of both sides received significant damage.

The second day of the assault on the island

By the morning of the next day, combat activity had decreased somewhat. This is explained by the fact that the Soviet boats ran out of fuel, and the Finnish sailors by that time had shot all their ammunition. But at this time the first of the German ships rushing to help the Finns approached the island. It was the minesweeper M 18.

By nine o'clock in the morning events began to unfold in a direction unfavorable for the paratroopers. When approaching the island, it was hit and sank while trying to deliver ammunition, which by that time was running low. The Finns managed to transport a reinforcement company consisting of one hundred and nine people to Sommers Island on the gunboat Turunmaa and additional boats. Their appearance immediately changed the balance of forces, providing the enemy with not only firepower, but also numerical superiority.

In the middle of the day, the landing of the reserve that had arrived by that time began, but it was carried out, according to military historians, so unprofessionally and ill-considered that the result was only new unjustified casualties. On the island itself the battle continued with the same intensity. There was an urgent need to suppress the enemy's mortar battery, but due to lack of communication, the paratroopers could not contact either the aircraft or the crews of the boats located nearby.

In the ring of enemy ships

Meanwhile, Sommers Island was surrounded in an increasingly dense ring by Finnish and German ships that approached almost closely. Their massive fire fell on both the Marines fighting on the shore and the ships supporting them. According to data available to military historians, during the failed operation to capture this strategically important island, seven Soviet torpedo boats and one “small hunter” boat were sunk. In addition, the Kama gunboat, the base minesweeper, as well as many torpedo and other vessels were seriously damaged. Four planes were shot down in the sky over the island.

Sad outcome of the operation

This incompetently prepared and planned landing ended tragically. The island remained in Finnish hands until 1944. The losses on our side, information about which were published only in recent years, amounted to three hundred and fifty-nine people killed and about a hundred wounded. The Finnish side lost one hundred and twenty-nine people in this battle.

Despite the fact that the operation to capture the island was a complete failure, its direct participants cannot be blamed for this. They fulfilled their duty to the end. The blame lies with those who sent people to certain death without providing them with the necessary means of combat and without providing adequate support for the large ships of the Baltic Fleet.

Today this island, which has become a monument to all those who died on its rocky shores, is visited by groups of excursionists whose trips are organized by Russian and Finnish travel companies.

July 1942, Baltic Fleet

In July 1942 The command of the Baltic Fleet attempted to capture Sommers Island.
Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. The situation in the Baltic deteriorated again in the summer of 1942, when Soviet submarines began operating on enemy communications. However, their path along the Gulf of Finland ran past the island (Finnish: Someri) - a small rocky island (dimensions 950 by 400 meters).

During the second half of 1941, there was a Soviet garrison on it, but then at the end of December the island was abandoned by our units and the Finns soon settled there. However, they were unable to sit for long on the windswept rocky piece of land and Sommers became a “no-man’s land.” But this did not last long: when they captured Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters in the spring of 1942, the Finnish command landed a garrison on the island (part of the 22nd separate coast guard company), equipped an observation point and a coastal battery. The island became an important point in the Finnish-German anti-submarine defense system in the Gulf of Finland. Its garrison was 92 people, armed with 5 guns (two of them 75-mm caliber, three 45-mm caliber), 7 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, 2 81-mm mortars, 7 heavy and 5 light machine guns. The Finnish command realistically assessed the possibility of a Soviet landing, so 4 strong defense points were equipped on the island, making up a single defensive system. The white nights allowed enemy posts to monitor the surface situation around the clock. When the command of the Baltic Fleet in the summer campaign of 1942 began massively sending submarines from Leningrad to enemy communications, it was decided to correct the mistake and return the island to the control of Soviet troops. The author of the idea and plan of the operation was the commander of the Kronstadt naval base - the main base of the Baltic Fleet, Captain 1st Rank G. I. Levchenko. And therefore, under his general leadership, a plan for his capture was developed, approved by the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet.
Before this, Vice Admiral Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko, as Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, participated in the defense of Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol and was the commander of the Crimean troops, but for the surrender of Kerch in January 1941 he was demoted in military rank to captain 1st rank (see). So Gordey Ivanovich needed success, as they say, desperately...
Unfortunately, a number of miscalculations were made when developing the operation plan. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. To capture the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in men, the landing party was noticeably inferior to it in firepower.
The reconnaissance also failed to reveal the enemy’s defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The peculiarities of the island's coast were not taken into account, which led to tragedy - during the landing, the well-armed and equipped soldiers who left the boats often drowned under the weight of the ammunition. The interaction with aviation was also not worked out, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and communication between the paratroopers (as well as the sailors) and the pilots was not provided for at all.
July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was led by captain 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the diagram.

By the end of July 7, 1942 All forces intended for the operation were fully prepared and at 23-33 the landing of troops and the loading of ammunition and special equipment began on Lavensaari.

At 00-11 on July 8, the landing on the boats was completed, and two minutes later the ships began to enter the roadstead.
At 00-30 landing groups moved towards Sommers. Their transition was ensured by patrols, and from 00-35 by four fighters.
By one o'clock in the morning The covering detachment entered the designated area.
At the same time, from 00-40 to 00-59 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, attacked the island in two waves from an altitude of 2300-4000 m. They bombed not very accurately - out of 120 100-kg bombs dropped, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by 2 raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, attacking from low altitudes in groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by 20-mm Oerlikon fire.
At 01-20 The landing groups turned around and went to the landing sites.

The sea was relatively calm (swell up to three points), and visibility was simply excellent (oh, those white nights). At a considerable distance - 20-30 cables - the Finns discovered Soviet boats and opened fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 m and began the landing, which was completed within just five minutes. But at the same time, torpedo boat No. 152 and the “hunter” MO-110 were damaged.
Group II also had a hard time. Approaching the shore under fire, the sailors and paratroopers became convinced that the boats could not get close to it. Some of them had to repeat this several times, trying to find convenient landing spots under fire. When unloading the radio station, it either got wet or the batteries drowned, and it could not work. The commander of the landing party refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 04-04 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade.
The losses were growing - the hull of torpedo boat No. 62 was damaged, and the superstructure of the MO-402, the commander was killed, and 4 crew members were injured.

III group was met with particularly intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and on TKA No. 121 the engines with the clutches turned on in forward stalled, and when starting the engines, it sat down on the rocks while moving. An attempt to save him after the landing was unsuccessful, and he remained on the rocks. Fortunately, we managed to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of MO-413 from this group apparently showed indecisiveness and landed the fighters later than the others, and he needed an additional order from V.A. Salamatina.
But group IV found itself in the most difficult situation. Her ships were unable to suppress enemy firing points, encountering strong resistance. The commander made the decision to land the fighters at the point intended for the III group. But when the boats with the landing force began to go around, from the west, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 fell behind. It had to land the paratroopers “anyhow.” During the departure, it was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and its crew, under incessant shelling, transferred to torpedo boat No. 152. Torpedo boat No. 131 also suffered - its commander was killed, 3 paratroopers were killed and 4 were wounded.
In total, of the 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers ended up on the island, another 7 were injured on board the torpedo boat, and the patrol boat MO-402 did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned during the landing. It was also not possible to deliver some of the machine guns to the shore (apparently a large number, since sailing with the Maxims was simply unthinkable).
The Finns' reaction to the actions of the Soviet fleet turned out to be very fast and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Sommers garrison, gunboats, as well as 5 patrol boats (Armament: 1 x 20 mm), were sent to his aid.
The first to arrive at the battlefield was the Uusimaa, which managed to repel the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then the Hämeenmaa and patrol boats arrived. During the battle with Finnish gunboats, torpedo boat No. 113 (commander - Senior Lieutenant A.I. Shumratov), which attacked the enemy together with boat No. 73, was killed. The sailors reported the sinking of one of the gunboats, but this information turned out to be unreliable.
During the battles at Sommers, messages that flocked to the headquarters of both sides contained, as a rule, greatly exaggerated information about the enemy’s losses, but for the Finns (who overestimated their successes by only two times!) this did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was sure that heavy damage was being inflicted on the enemy, and his ability to continue the fight was decreasing. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats received varying degrees of damage, not one of them was sunk.
Around 03-18 From the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, a prearranged signal was received, meaning: “It has gained a foothold, please send a second echelon.” However, in response to Salamatin’s request, Levchenko responded half an hour late that the second echelon would be sent after occupying the island.
And on Sommers there was a fierce battle. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Itapaya, all the guns of which were destroyed, and out of 26 defenders only three managed to break through to their own. The rest were killed or wounded.
The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet planes carried out several attacks on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while fighters repelled raids by Finnish planes that carried out bombing attacks on support forces. During one of them, torpedo boat No. 33 from the covering detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat were also damaged.

Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, realizing that the battles were much more serious than planned, ordered the gunboat (speed 8-10 knots) to go to Sommers. From Grafskaya and Batareinaya bays (the village of Shepelevo, 45 miles from Sommers to the southeast, where the Shepelevsky lighthouse is, see) four torpedo and five patrol boats were sent to reinforce the fighting forces.
In the morning hours of July 8 The activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats ran out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats shot up almost all their ammunition. But a German approached the battlefield
At 08.48 The Baltic Fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers, torpedo boat No. 22, which was trying to deliver ammunition to the paratroopers, caught fire and exploded due to shell hits.
Finns by 11-30 To help their garrison, the Germans managed to transport a company of 109 people on a gunboat and eight boats.
The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation; the Soviet landing force found itself in a difficult situation. Now the enemy side had not only firepower, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his gunboats supported their troops with fire from medium-caliber guns, while Soviet boats had only small-caliber guns. Our gunboat Kama, sent to Sommers, was escorted by minesweeper boats, the speed of which with the installed trawls was very low. And although the Soviet coastal battery from Lavensaari entered the battle in the afternoon, its fire was not adjusted and was unlikely to bring much benefit to the paratroopers. The approaching gunboat "Kama" was forced to direct almost all its firepower against the Finnish ships.
At 14-30 The commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, which was part of the Kronstadt Naval Base, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin, ordered the landing of the reserve in the amount of 57 machine gunners, the loading of the radio station and food onto torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101.
Around 16-00 They headed towards Sommers and after about 45 minutes, under fire from Finnish ships, they approached its eastern shore and began landing soldiers and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that it happened during the day, everything was organized extremely poorly - again, as at night, the radio station was drowned, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, they managed to remove 23 wounded from the shore. From them it became known that there was a heavy battle on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy’s mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other soldiers on the shore. Already on the way out, torpedo boat No. 31 was hit and exploded.
It seems that the Soviet command was not preparing for serious battles for Sommerse and there were no units on Lavensaari that could be sent to help the landed units without the threat of weakening the defenses of the base itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing in a timely manner, and then it was too late - German and Finnish planes, ships, boats and guns of the island garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supplies, removal of the wounded, and then the evacuation of the surviving soldiers impossible.
By the evening of July 8 Instead of the gunboat "Kama", on which both main-caliber guns were out of action, a patrol ship and base minesweepers (specially built ships with strong artillery armament) entered the battle. But their help was clearly too late. By this time, Finnish minelayers "Riilahti" and "Routsinsalmi" (Armament: 2 x 75 mm, 2 x 40 mm, 1 x 20 mm, 3 bullets) and German ships - the floating battery "SAT 28" - approached Sommers "(Ost, 1 150 mm) - a converted soil hauling scow or bulk carrier. Officially, it was listed as a carrier of heavy artillery (Schwere Artillerie Trager - SAT). , the floating base (tender) “Nettelbeck” (4x105mm guns?) and the minesweeper, which replaced its brother “M 18”, which suffered greatly from Soviet air raids. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times he came within 500 m of the shore. His crew decided to demonstrate to the Finns their “brotherhood in arms”: a strike force of 10 people formed on the ship was sent ashore, as well as several boxes with hand grenades, which the garrison needed. On the night of July 9, the Soviet command made a last attempt to rectify the situation. Torpedo boats launched by the patrol ship “Burya” together with the minesweeper T-207 were launched to attack the enemy ships.

Three boats managed to fire one torpedo each, but they did not reach their targets, and two boats were hit. An attempt to deliver ammunition to the island on three patrol boats also ended in failure. When hit by a shell, it exploded and died along with everyone on board, including the commander of the landing detachment, Captain 2nd Rank K.A. Shilov, MO-306. And although firefights between enemy ships continued all day, the position of the landing force on the island became hopeless. True, in the morning the pilots reported that they had torpedoed two enemy ships five miles north of Sommers, but this message was not true and could not change the situation. On July 9 at 12:30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector radiogram reported to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, and the commander of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, about the situation in the area of the Lavensaari and Sommers islands. The report said that there were no forces and means to continue the operation, and on Sommers itself there had been no hostilities since zero hours on July 9. At 19-20 G.I. Levchenko received a new message, which, in particular, said: “...No movement was detected on the island. If a landing force is detected, I will continue the capture operation.”
On the night of July 10, 1942 An attempt was made to deliver two scouts to Sommers, but the blockade of the island by enemy ships was too dense and Soviet boats were unable to approach it. Skirmishes between ships also did not bring results. The pilots again reported sunk and damaged ships, but this had no effect on the activity of the German-Finnish forces. In the afternoon, they again tried to organize a reconnaissance group landing on Sommers, but then postponed this operation for the night.
At 01-00 July 11, 1942 captain 1st rank G.I. Levchenko, believing that the fighting on Sommers was over and trying to avoid new losses, decided to stop the operation.
In these battles, seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Baltic Fleet were lost. The base minesweeper was damaged, and the gunboat "Kama" was practically out of action due to technical malfunctions - although one of the guns was able to be put into operation, the gunboat's steering failed and was inactive for a long time and had to be towed. On the first day of fighting alone, 10 torpedo, 5 patrol and 5 other types of boats were damaged.
But even this seemed not enough to the Finns, so they “included in the list of their victories” 8 ships and boats sunk by coastal artillery, the fleet reported 7 destroyed Soviet boats, and another gunboat (“Volga”) of the same type “Kame” and 2 boats Finnish aviation chalked it up. The Finns and Germans acknowledged damage to the minesweeper M 18, the gunboats Hämeenmaa and Turunmaa, and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army lost 15 killed and 45 wounded, and the navy lost 6 killed and 18 wounded. They estimated the Soviet losses in people as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and approximately another 200 people who drowned along with the lost ships. After the end of the fighting, the Finns covered Sommers with minefields and it remained under their control until Finland left the war in September 1944.
Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the lack of provision of landing ships with special landing ships, the inaction of large ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ineffectiveness of the fire of coastal batteries, the Swiss historian J. Meister, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet side, was forced to admit: “Russian landing units, although not numerous enough, as well as the crews torpedo boats fought very bravely, but they were unable to save the situation in this misguided operation."

ORDER ON CONDUCTING THE LANDING OPERATION OF THE KBF TO CAPTURE SOMMERS ISLAND

In the period from 07/08 to 07/10/1942 The Red Banner Baltic Fleet carried out an amphibious operation to capture the island. Sommers.
The operation was prepared and led by the commander of the Main Naval Base, Captain 1st Rank Comrade. Levchenko with his staff.
Despite the fact that the situation that prevailed at the beginning of the operation made it possible to carry it out successfully, the operation was a complete failure and the set goal was not achieved.
As a result of analyzing the operation report and studying the circumstances of the case on the spot, it turned out:
1. The planning and preparation of the operation were carried out poorly, since: a) the documents were sent to the performers only 34-36 hours before the start of the operation.
The preparation of personnel and material resources was unacceptably limited in time and turned out to be completely unsatisfactory;
b) when developing the operation and documents, the commander of the landing detachment was not involved, the exact landing sites were not determined, the headquarters of the GMBB was not convinced and did not check how much Major Pasko understood the task at hand, and most importantly, how much he understood the need for speed and decisiveness of action on the shore.
The commanders of the TKA and boats of the Ministry of Defense were not sufficiently familiar with the nature of the depths and coastline of the island, as a result of which, during the landing, the boats did not take advantage of the depth of the island’s shores, which allowed the boats to approach the shore;
c) the documents developed for the operation did not meet the requirements of BUMS and NBDSHS. The combat order was drawn up unsatisfactorily (the first point of the combat order was formulated unclearly, the third point - the idea of a solution - was completely absent, the tasks for the landing commander were not set in the order).
The organization of command for the operation was not clearly defined, there was no combat control scheme, which led to the unsatisfactory state of combat control during the operation.
According to the combat order and in fact, the management of the operation was carried out by two persons: captain 1st rank comrade. Levchenko and his 2nd deputy, by order of captain 1st rank comrade. Soloukhin, but the operation was actually commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Salamatin, who was entrusted with command of the operation at sea.
Communications in the operation worked unsatisfactorily and did not provide clear control.
2. The operation, designed for surprise and swiftness of action, was not properly ensured either during preparation or during its execution. There was no consideration of the possibility of counteraction by enemy gunboats, destroyers and patrol ships, although there was information about their presence in the Aspe area and in the skerries north of the island. Sommers were at the headquarters of the main naval base. Therefore, sufficient forces were not allocated for cover. Artillery support for the landing was extremely weak. Aviation actions were envisaged only during landings.
3. The use of TKAs for landing troops was incorrect, because the experience of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet confirmed that TKAs were of little use for this purpose due to their weak artillery. weapons and low survivability. The task of landing troops ashore in these conditions could be successfully carried out by boats of the Ministry of Defense and even KM, the loss of which would be less noticeable for the fleet than the loss of a TKA.
4. TKA actions against enemy ships were ineffective due to the fact that
a) the tactical training of the boats was low;
b) after reloading, when ready, the boats were immediately sent to attack in groups of 1-2 boats, and not in groups, as a result of which the enemy ships repelled these attacks, successive and with a large gap in time, by concentrating the fire of all ships.
5. The support ships (CL "Kama" and the TFR "Storm" and 2 BTSh that arrived the next day) were used hesitantly and did not achieve their goals.

6. While the landing party on the island lay low and did not advance, the enemy sent up reinforcements in the morning at 6.00 on July 8th. The speed and suddenness of the operation were lost. The command (Comrade Soloukhin and Comrade Salamatin) did not show the necessary determination to strengthen and support the landing force. The reinforcement of the landing force was landed only at 16.37 on July 8, the gunboat "Kama" came for support at 14.20 on July 8, and the BTShch and SKR arrived on July 9, 42. The 4 gunboats located in Kronstadt did not participate in the operation.
7. The personnel of the landing detachment were not prepared for this type of operation, which required courage, speed and decisiveness of action. The detachment commander, Pasko, himself showed criminal passivity and cowardice. After the death of the commissar of the airborne detachment, political instructor Comrade. Bunarev's detachment remained without proper control throughout the entire operation.
Commander of the naval operation, Captain 2nd Rank Comrade. Salamatin, being the first to notice the cowardice of the landing commander Pasko and knowing that the detachment was left without control, did not take the necessary measures to restore this control, placing one of the commanders at his disposal at the head of the detachment.
8. On the use of the Air Force:
a) in the planning table of the GMB headquarters for the operation, the tasks in stages are not reflected for the Air Force as a whole, but are detailed down to the regiments and individual groups of aircraft.
The command and headquarters of the Air Force had to make their own calculations for solving the task;
b) the tasks of the Air Force were set only for the period of transition and landing, the use of aviation was not envisaged in the future, and the Air Force commander was not oriented to the entire depth of the operation;
c) Air Force strikes were ineffective.
9. The Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet exercised general leadership without properly involving its headquarters. The headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was ignored by both the Military Council and the command of the GMBB.
Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Comrade. Rall and the head of the operational department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet headquarters, captain 1st rank comrade. Petrov did not show personal initiative in leading the preparation of the operation.
The failure of the operation and the large losses of the fleet in people and combat boats were the result of: a gross operational miscalculation (underestimating possible opposition from enemy ships and overestimating one’s own forces), poor training of people and equipment, and a completely unsatisfactory organization of command and combat control. The extensive experience of the fleets, and especially the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, in conducting amphibious operations in the current war, apparently passed by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the commander of the GVMB and their headquarters. I order:
1. The Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet should, as soon as possible, organize a study of the experience of landing operations carried out in the current war in the Black Sea, Northern Fleets and especially in its Baltic theater, and draw the necessary conclusions.
First of all, commanders and chiefs of staff of formations and naval bases should be involved in the study. Implementation should be reported by September 10, 1942.
2. The military councils of fleets (flotillas) take the necessary measures to once and for all put an end to the harmful phenomena of indifference of higher headquarters, and, first of all, the headquarters of the fleet (flotilla) in operations carried out by units or formations, regardless of their scale, as well as cases of ignorance individual commanders of formations of their own and higher headquarters. Stop the irresponsibility of commanders and staffs in preparing and conducting the operation. Increase responsibility for the development of documents, avoiding such operational and tactical miscalculations. Any operational and tactical miscalculation in an operation and in battle should be considered as an irresponsible performance of a combat mission, bringing the perpetrators to trial in a Military Tribunal.
I demand that the military councils of fleets and flotillas organize their work, both on the march and on the coastal FCP, so that the headquarters of the fleets are truly combat control bodies, and not retroactive recorders of events, so that not a single issue related to combat operations or their provision, would not have been decided without the knowledge and opinion of the fleet headquarters and, first of all, its operational department.

KUZNETSOV

CVMA, f. 79, no. 39809, l. 250-256. Script.

The naval pilots assessed their actions in support of this landing operation as follows: “In accordance with an extremely poorly drawn up plan, 12 IL-4 bombed the island garrison an hour before the landing, thereby predetermining the loss of surprise and heavy losses of the assault groups. At dawn, the enemy command pulled a relatively large naval group into the area, which not only supported the garrison with fire, but also replenished it with people and ammunition. Subsequently, the enemy managed to completely block our landing, which ultimately led to his complete death. At noon on July 9, the ground battles ended. Having no connection with the shore, our boats tried several times during July 9-10 to land reinforcements on the island, but either could not break the blockade or died in battle. All this time, the Baltic Fleet Air Force, which had undeniable air supremacy, constantly attacked enemy ships. The torpedo bombers of the 1st GMT alone made 15 sorties (the crews of Drozdov, Bunimovich, Presnyakov and the deputy squadron commander, Captain V.A. Balebin) and dropped 12 torpedoes, reporting the destruction of 2 gunboats and three patrol ships. However, of the Finnish and German ships that took part in the operation (Finnish minelayers "Ruotsinsalmi", "Riilahti", gunboats "Uusima", "Hämenmaa", "Turunmaa", German minesweepers "M 18", "M 37", heavy floating battery "Ost" and floating base "Nettelbeck") not a single one was sunk. In most cases, torpedo attacks were perceived as dropping mines, but the morning attack on July 9, directed against Finnish minelayers, was described for the first time in enemy documents as a torpedo attack. The Germans perceived this Finnish report with a certain degree of skepticism - they themselves were still not convinced that the enemy had torpedo bombers in its arsenal. With a certain stretch, the results of the actions of the aircraft of the 1st GMTAP can only be attributed to the damage on July 11 to a gunboat, on which, while repelling another raid, a 20-mm gun exploded, killing two and wounding 8 people. Presnyakov's Il-4 was damaged by the retaliatory actions of Finnish fighters called to the battle area. The plane miraculously did not catch fire and, with its gas tanks riddled, landed on the island of Lavensari.
The command of the brigade and regiment was clearly dissatisfied with the results of the first strikes. The report of the 1st gmtap for the 13th month of the war (22.6-22.7.1942), in particular, said the following:
“12 sorties carried out to respond to torpedo attacks on enemy ships were ineffective due to:
a) Insufficient training of flight personnel and lack of experience in combat torpedo attacks. As a result, the attack was carried out illiterately, with all aircraft on one side, which made it possible for enemy ships to easily evade the attack at speed by maneuvering.
b) The torpedo launching sight was not used by all crews when launching an attack; torpedoes were dropped by eye, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the strike (crews who neglected the PTN-5 sight: Major Kuznetsov, Lieutenant Kudryashov, Captain Litovchuk).
c) The approach to the target and the attack took place at an altitude of 50-30 meters, as a result, the crews did not sufficiently determine the location and formation of enemy ships, could not accurately determine the elements of their movement and choose the most advantageous approach for the attack.
d) Tasks for a torpedo strike were assigned to the duty crews 20-30 minutes before departure, which did not allow crews to be trained, and the crews went to complete tasks with general pre-flight preparation.”