home Zander Hidden "Frontier" of air control. New solutions to old low-altitude location problems

Hidden "Frontier" of air control. New solutions to old low-altitude location problems

He reported to the president that the Aerospace Forces, in accordance with the army and navy rearmament program adopted in 2012, had already received 74 new radar stations. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance in the country's airspace looks good. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the skies above it.

In Russia, the solution of this task is entrusted to the radar station of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficient, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control were more and more complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and the low level of equipping civil aviation with responders of the unified state radar identification system.

Control over flights in the "lower" airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megalopolises and especially in the Moscow zone, has become much more complicated. At the same time, the activity of terrorist organizations, capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft, has intensified.

The airspace control system is also influenced by the emergence of qualitatively new surveillance equipment: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information from the observed aircraft, parameters are transmitted to the controller directly from the aircraft navigation devices, and etc.

In order to streamline all available surveillance equipment, in 1994 it was decided to create a combined system of radar facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first regulatory document that initiated the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, it was a dual-use interagency system. The purpose of creating the FSR and the KVP was announced to combine the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in the airspace of Russia.

As work was carried out to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles of the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Federal Air Transport Agency).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out under the State Arms Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The main contractor for the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the minimum allowable level, but work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERS).

Until 2015, the area of \u200b\u200bthe airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces grew steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (URS). This system of reconnaissance and airspace control was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

On the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program, which had been started, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of reconnaissance control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2016 and Beyond, approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, envisages a full-scale deployment of a single federal system by the end of last year.

However, the action of the corresponding FTP ended in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015) ”with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were supposed to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP ended its operation, but the new one was never approved.

Previously, the coordination of the relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of Airspace, established by a presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary regulatory framework.

Moreover, in 2015 in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control the post of general designer was removed. The coordination of the FSR and KVP bodies at the state level actually ceased.

At the same time, competent specialists now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-use radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with a reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack.

The new dual-use system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the strengthening of threats from the air and outer space in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new type of armed forces - the Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the probable directions of the strike of aerospace attack weapons - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This without fail requires new funding for the SDF and KVP under the appropriate federal target program or in another form, the re-creation of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period the tasks of warning about an air attack and information support of combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become priorities.

- Military columnist for Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy (1998).
Observer "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

Radar fieldis called the area of \u200b\u200bspace with a given height of the lower boundary, within which the radar grouping provides reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility zone (detection) is the area of \u200b\u200bspace around the radar within which the station can detect and track aerial targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The border of the radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar visibility zones. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of enemy air in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar in the vertical plane is limited and is usually 20-30 °. This leads to the presence of so-called "dead craters" in the radar visibility zone, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of \u200b\u200blocal items is difficult. Even if the radars are deployed in a position that meets the requirements for it, on medium-rugged terrain the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the equipment for protection against passive interference (the system for selecting a moving target) does not completely "remove" marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, observation of targets in this zone is difficult. In addition, when the radar is operating with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.

The section of the radar visibility zone in the horizontal plane at a given height can be conventionally taken as a ring centered at the radar station. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range of an air target of this type at a given height. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the radar "dead funnel".

When creating a RLP grouping in the intelligence system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible removal of confident detection in the most probable direction of enemy air raids (in front of the leading edge).

A continuous radar field should cover the space over the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the air enemy.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a solid field should be at least 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance assets (number of radars).

It is necessary to dwell on the choice of the optimal value of the height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for fulfilling the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radars, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the less the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar needs to be located, the more the radar will be required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the less the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and development trends of EHV already now require the creation of a radar field in the range of heights from several tens of meters (50-60 m).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower boundary, a huge amount of radar equipment will be required. Calculations show that with a decrease in the height of the lower boundary of the field from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and with a decrease from 500 m to 100 m - by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

Currently, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) zone of action by ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the front edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values \u200b\u200bof the intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units by radar reconnaissance units in their single grouping, we will take the following assumptions:

1. All units are armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility zones;

Condition: Let it be required to create a continuous radar field with the height of the lower boundary "H min". The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar on "H min" is known and is equal to "D".

The task can be solved by the location of the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (staggered).

In this case, the RL field on "H min" will have the form (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radar will be equal to:

In the first method, d \u003d D \u003d 1.41 D;

For the second d \u003d D \u003d 1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, it can be concluded that the creation of the radar field by the method of positioning the radar at the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern) is economically more profitable, since it requires fewer stations.

A grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle will be called a grouping of type "A".

While beneficial in terms of cost savings, the A-class does not provide other critical requirements. For example, the failure of any of the radars leads to the formation of large dips in the radar field. Losses of air targets during wiring will be observed even if all radars are in good working order, since the “dead craters” in the radar visibility zones are not blocked.

A grouping of type "A" has an unsatisfactory field characteristic in front of the leading edge. In areas occupying a total of over 20% of the front line width, the removal of the reconnaissance zone in front of the leading edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of the radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general it is possible to draw a conclusion that the type "A" grouping can be used only in exceptional cases with an acute shortage of funds and in secondary directions deep in the operational formation of the front front lines

The appendix presents a radar grouping, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type "B". Here, the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range "D" at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. The intervals between the radar in the lines d \u003d D, and the distance between the lines

C \u003d D \u003d 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by the B-type grouping, the space is simultaneously viewed by three radars, and in some areas even a family. Due to this, a high stability of the radar field and the reliability of the guidance of air targets are achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This constellation provides overlapping of radar “dead craters” and local object zones (which can be achieved only with d \u003d D), and also excludes possible failures in the field due to distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field in time, each radar participating in the creation of the field must work around the clock. This is not practically feasible. Therefore, at each point, not one, but two or more radars should be deployed, which form the radar.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the orb.

To create a continuous radar field, it is advisable to arrange the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the tops of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the specified height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between the radar equal to the detection range of air targets "D" at the height "H min" of the lower boundary of the field in this area (d \u003d D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the "H min" field.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3 (5-6) / 1997

On some problems of control over the observance of the order of use of airspace

Colonel General V.F. MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A. Goryachev

The STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is governed by laws consistent with international norms, as well as by regulatory documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, air traffic control, ensure flight safety, monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, a Unified Air Traffic Control System (EU ATC) has been created. The formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the command facilities of this system and in their activities are guided by the same regulatory and legal documents. At the same time, readiness to repel a surprise attack by an air enemy is ensured not only by continuous study of the current situation by the Air Defense Forces command posts, but also by control over the use of airspace. The question is legitimate: is there a duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Among the reasons for this are differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the amount of their financing, the considerable size of the territory, and departmental disunity.

Data on the air situation in the ATC system is used to generate commands to be transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to identify aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, and aim weapons and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of construction of these systems, and, consequently, their capabilities differ significantly. It is significant that the positions of the ES ATC radar facilities are located along the airways and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m.Air defense radio engineering units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of potential enemy aircraft.

The Air Defense Forces' control system over the use of airspace took shape in the 1960s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, reconnaissance and information centers (RIC) of command posts of formations, formations and the Central command post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command and control units of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely identification of aircraft, the belonging of which has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft that violate the procedure for the use of airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation; assistance to the EU ATC authorities in providing assistance to aircraft in force majeure, as well as search and rescue services.

Tracking the order of using the airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and air traffic control: radar consists in tracking aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics using radar means; control room - in determining the estimated location of aircraft based on the plan (flight requests, traffic schedules) and messages on actual flights,. arriving at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC bodies and departmental command posts in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for the use of airspace.

In the presence of radar and air traffic control data, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous connection is established between the information obtained by the instrumental method (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the notification of the flight of this object (flight number or request, tail number, initial, intermediate and final route points, etc.) ... If it was not possible to identify the radar information with the control room, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the airspace use procedure, data about it is immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures are taken adequate to the situation. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not comply with the dispatcher's orders, air defense fighters intercept and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of the control system functioning, one should first of all mention the insufficient elaboration of the legal and regulatory framework governing the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of the border of Russia with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for monitoring its crossing has been unjustifiably delayed. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, the clarification of the ownership of the aircraft flying on the part of these states ends when it is already in the depths of the territory of Russia. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense on duty forces is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are wasted unjustifiably and excessive psychological tension is created among the personnel of combat crews, fraught with the most serious consequences. This problem is partially solved as a result of the organization of joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only if the current Regulation on the procedure for the use of airspace is replaced by a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 90s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the order of using airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to the reduction in the number of radio engineering troops and, as a consequence, the number of subunits, and in the first place those of them were disbanded, the maintenance and maintenance of combat duty of which required large material costs. But it was these units, located on the sea coast, on islands, hills and in the mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support led to the fact that the remaining subunits much more often than before, lose their combat effectiveness due to the lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the RTV's capabilities to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the Russian borders have significantly decreased.

In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the closest command posts of the Air Defense Forces has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights are received via bypass communication channels with long delays or do not arrive at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, makes it difficult to identify radar and scheduled dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems have arisen in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. Facts are known when flights are performed not only without notifying the Air Defense Forces, but also without the permission of the ATC authorities. At the regional level, there is disunity between enterprises in the use of airspace. The commercialization of airline operations even affects the presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand their payment, and the troops do not have the funds for these purposes. The problem is solved by making unofficial extracts that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over the observance of the established procedure for the use of airspace decreases.

Changes in the air traffic structure had a certain impact on the quality of the control system functioning. Currently, there is a tendency for the growth of international flights and off-schedule flights, and, consequently, the workload of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of communication channels at the air defense command post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors has sharply increased when receiving notifications about planned flights, messages about departures, etc.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially solved as the Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the merger of departmental radar systems, for the first time, it will be possible to use a common information model of air traffic by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of data on the air situation, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, and others. departmental air traffic control points.

In the process of theoretical study of the options for using the EARLS, the question arose about the expediency of further assigning the Air Defense Forces the task of monitoring the order of using the airspace. After all, the EU ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the calculations of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is enough to exercise control only by the forces of the EU ATC centers, which, having direct communication with the aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transmit a large amount of planning and dispatch information to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and to further identify radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, being on guard of the air borders of the state, cannot rely solely on the EU ATC in identifying aircraft that violate the state border. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and in the centers of the EU ATC minimizes the probability of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order in the long term: the disciplining influence of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zone center of the EU ATC, but also by the calculation of the control group of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization contributes to the prompt detection of violations of the airspace use procedure and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the Air Defense Forces' control system on flight safety, but practice shows a direct link between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, there is objectively a danger of destruction of previously created and sufficiently well-functioning systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major state tasks as border protection and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the preservation of the combat effectiveness of the radio-technical troops, which form the basis of the Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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of these Federal Regulations

144. Control over compliance with the requirements of these Federal Regulations is carried out by the Federal Air Transport Agency, air traffic services (flight control) in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft that violate the procedure for using the airspace (hereinafter - violating aircraft) and aircraft that violate the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. In the event that an air traffic services (flight control) body detects a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense body and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with him.

146. Air defense bodies provide radar control of the airspace and submit data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects to the relevant centers of the Unified System:

a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) are unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting the "Distress" signal;

e) flying letters "A" and "K";

f) flying for search and rescue operations.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) the use of airspace without the permission of the relevant center of the Unified System under the authorization procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) non-observance of the conditions brought by the center of the Unified System in the permit for the use of airspace;

c) failure to comply with the commands of the air traffic services (flight control) bodies and the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) non-observance of the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) failure to comply with the established time and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

e) flight of a group of aircraft in excess of the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;

g) use of the airspace of the restricted area, flight restriction area without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unplanned (undeclared) aerodrome (site), except for cases of a forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services (flight control) body;

i) non-observance by the aircraft crew of the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except in cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);