The principle of creating a continuous radar field. Scientific and technical problems

This problem can be solved with affordable, cost-effective and sanitary means. Such means are being built on the principles of semi-active radar (PAL) using the accompanying illumination of the transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today practically all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty field for airspace control at extremely low altitudes (PMA) is difficult and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to compact the orders of radar stations (radar), the creation of an extensive communication network, saturation of the surface space with sources of radio emissions and passive multiple reflections, the complexity of the ornithological and meteorological situation, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of regulatory legal acts related to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments in exercising control over the surface space are disjointed. All this significantly complicates the possibility of organizing radar airspace monitoring at WWI.

Why a continuous surface airspace monitoring field is needed

For what purposes is it necessary to create a continuous field for monitoring surface airspace in WWI in peacetime? Who will be the main consumer of the information you receive?

The experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit, limited in its goals, objectives and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace in WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border Guard Service - above the state border, and not higher than 10 meters from the ground. Unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for take-off or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around secure facilities.

EMERCOM - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of stay of protected persons.

This situation testifies to the lack of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the near-ground low-altitude environment.

In 2010, the problem of control over the use of airspace in WWI was transferred from the field of responsibility of the state to the field of responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace was established for flights in class G (small aircraft) airspace. From now on, flights in this airspace class can be performed without obtaining an ATC clearance.

If we consider this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, and in the near future, and passenger "flying motorcycles", then a whole range of tasks arises related to ensuring the safety of the use of airspace at extremely low altitudes above populated areas, industrial-hazardous areas ...

Who will control movement in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadrocopter for flights (attention!) Outside airfields by 2020. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law "On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aerial vehicles." In accordance with this law, all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) weighing more than 250 g are subject to registration.

In order to register a UAV, you must submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form indicating the data of the drone and its owner. However, judging by how things are going with the registration of manned light and ultralight aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now two different organizations are responsible for the registration of light (ultralight) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a result, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide field of monitoring at PMV in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hindered by restrictions on sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of RES. The existing legislation strictly regulates the radiation regimes of RES, especially in populated areas. This is unswervingly considered when designing new RES.

So what's the bottom line? The need for monitoring surface airspace at WWI objectively persists and will only grow.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining the field on the WWI, the contradictory legal framework, the absence of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

It is urgent to start developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of the airspace of the WWI.

The maximum height of the class G airspace border varies up to 300 meters in the Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in the regions of Eastern Siberia. IN last years In the civil aviation of Russia, there is an intensive growth in the number of registered facilities and operators of general aviation (GA). As of 2015, over 7 thousand aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that in Russia as a whole, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) of legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft are registered. The remaining 70-80% fly without an operator's certificate or without registration of aircraft at all.

According to NP GLONASS estimates, sales of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Russia annually increase by 5-10%, and by 2025 they will be purchased in Russia 2.5 million. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS can account for about 3-5% of the global total.

Monitoring: Economical, Affordable, Environmentally Friendly

If we take an open-minded approach to the means of creating continuous monitoring of PMA in peacetime, then this problem can be solved with affordable, cost-effective and sanitary means. Such means are being built on the principles of semi-active radar (PAL) using the accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today practically all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. SNS Research has published a report, Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 2013-2023, and expects to see more investment in both sectors by 2023 in developing such radar technologies. USD 10 billion, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023 will amount to almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the illumination transmitter and the radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. The bistatic radar consists of an accompanying illumination transmitter and a radar receiver, separated by a base distance.

As an accompanying illumination, the radiation of transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used. The illumination transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver's antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and a delayed echo from the target.

In the presence of a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PALs is the vast coverage areas of broadcast and communication signals. So, the zones of different mobile operators almost completely overlap, complementing each other. In addition to the zones of illumination of cellular communication, the territory of the country is covered by overlapping radiation fields of broadcasting transmitters of TV, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position network for radar monitoring at PMV, a deployed communication network is required. Dedicated secure APNs - packet data transmission channels based on M2M telematics technology - have such capabilities. Typical characteristics of the throughput of such channels at a peak load are not worse than 20 Kb / s, but according to the experience of application they are almost always much higher.

JSC "NPP" KANT "is researching the possibility of detecting targets in the field of illumination of cellular networks. In the course of research, it was found that the most widespread coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is carried out by a communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication with a speed of up to 170 Kb / s between elements of a multi-position radar separated by regional distances.

The work carried out within the framework of R&D showed that typical suburban territorial frequency planning of a cellular network provides the ability to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflecting surface of less than 1 sq. m.

The high suspension height of the base stations on the antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems allow solving the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using the stealth technology, using the spaced-apart location methods.

Within the framework of R&D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular networks, a passive receiving module detector (PPM) of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field tests of the PPM model within the boundaries of a cellular communication network of the GSM 900 standard with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the possibility of detecting a Yak-52 type aircraft at an estimated range of flights, a DJI Phantom 2 drone by a UAV , moving automobile and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial and energy characteristics of detection and the capabilities of the GSM signal in terms of target resolution were evaluated. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping of information from the test area to a remote observation indicator is demonstrated.

Thus, to create a continuous round-the-clock multifrequency overlapping location field in the surface space on the PMV, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the combination of information streams obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcast) to short decimeter (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data are available for this. We can safely say that the accumulated information base, technologies and the very principle of the hidden PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: "Diagram of a bistatic radar". For example, the current coverage area of \u200b\u200bthe borders of the Southern Federal District by the signal of the mobile operator "Beeline"

To assess the scale of the placement of illumination transmitters, let's take, for example, the average Tver region. It has an area of \u200b\u200b84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people, there are 43 broadcasting transmitters for broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with a radiation power of 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analog transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters of television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1500 transmitting radio technical communication objects of various affiliations (mainly base stations of cellular communication) with radiation power from units of mW in an urban area to several hundred watts in a suburban area. The suspension height of the light transmitters varies from 50 to 270 meters.

Polygon Ashuluk. Radar station "Sky-UE". This three-dimensional radar has no foreign analogues. Photo: Georgy DANILOV Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects
At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and means, often duplicating each other and eating up huge budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

Ending. Beginning at # 2 for 2012

At the same time, due to limited spatial and functional capabilities, the existing FSR and KVP does not provide a sufficient level of integration of departmental radar systems and is unable to perform the entire volume of tasks assigned to it.

The limitations and disadvantages of the created FSR and KVP can be briefly defined as follows:
SITV TC ES ATM with air defense control bodies are deployed not throughout the country, but only in the Central, Eastern and partially North-Western and Caucasian-Ural zones of responsibility for air defense (56% of the required for a full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL)
less than 40% of the RF Ministry of Transport of the RF Ministry of Transport have been modernized in order to perform dual-use functions, while the RF Ministry of Defense RF RTP has ceased to be backbone in the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP;
the information on the air situation issued by the TC ES ATM and RLP LT in terms of spatial, qualitative and probabilistic-temporal characteristics often does not correspond to the modern requirements of the air defense control bodies (VKO);
radar, flight and planning information received from the ATM ES TC is used in solving air defense (VKO) tasks ineffectively due to the low level of equipping the air defense command post (VKO) with adapted automation systems;
the joint automated processing of data from various sources of information of the RF Armed Forces and the EU ATM is not provided, which significantly reduces the reliability of the identification and identification of air objects in peacetime;
the level of equipment of FSR and KVP facilities with high-speed digital means and communication and data transmission systems does not correspond to modern requirements for the efficiency and reliability of the exchange of radar, flight and planning information;
there are shortcomings in pursuing a unified technical policy in the creation, production, supply and operation of dual-use equipment used in the FSR and KVP;
the coordination of measures for the technical equipment of the facilities allocated to the FSR and the KVP, within the framework of various FTPs, including the modernization of the ATM EU and the improvement of control and communication systems of the RF Armed Forces, is insufficiently effective;
the existing regulatory legal documents do not fully reflect the issues of the use of SITV, RTP DN of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, involved in radar support of the EU ATM centers, as well as the use of the means of state identification of the EU GRLO installed on the radar of the DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia;
the possibilities of the zonal interagency commissions on the use and air defense systems for coordinating the activities of the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the Ministry of Defense of Russia on the use and operation of technical means of the FSR and the air defense system in the zones of responsibility for air defense are practically not realized.

Mobile altimeter, type PRV-13
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To eliminate the aforementioned shortcomings and implement the national interests of the Russian Federation in the field of use and STL, full-scale deployment of FSS and STL in all regions of Russia, further integration with the EU ATM based on the use of basic information technologies for observation and STOL, modernized and promising radar, automation and communication primarily dual-use.

The strategic goal of the development of the FSR and the STL is to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and air defense in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) tasks, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, ensuring air traffic safety based on integrated use radar systems and assets of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, assets and resources.

In the weekly "Military Industrial Courier" (No. 5 of 02/08/2012), the commander of the EKR, Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko drew public attention that the current state of the low-altitude radar field within the Russian Federation is not in the best configuration.

Therefore, customers and performers are full of enthusiasm and find mutually acceptable solutions in the most difficult situations and casuistry of modern legislation in the interests of the FTP implementation.

Based on the results of the second stage of the FTP, a significant increase in the efficiency and quality of solving the problems of air defense, protection of the state border in the airspace, radar support of aviation flights and air traffic management in important air routes should be ensured with a limited composition of forces, means and resources of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with the VKO Concept for the period up to 2016 and further perspective, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in April 2006, one of the main directions of the VKO construction at the present time is the full-scale deployment of the FSR and the KVP throughout the country.

To ensure the full integration of the departmental radar systems of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the formation on this basis of a single information space on the state of the air situation as one of the main areas of concentration of efforts in the construction of the country's aerospace defense, it is advisable to further develop the FSR and KVP in the following stages:
Stage III - short term (2011–2015);
Stage IV - mid-term (2016–2020);
Stage V - long-term perspective (after 2020).

The main task of the development of the FSR and KVP in the short term is the deployment of the FSR and KVP in all regions of Russia. At the same time, during this period, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive modernization of the EA radar in order to increase the efficiency of the use of radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM authorities of the Ministry of Transport of Russia to solve air defense (VKO) problems and increase the area of \u200b\u200bcontrolled airspace.

Radar station 22Ж6 "Desna"
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To create a radar field with improved parameters, a decision was required to continue work within the framework of the federal target program "Improvement of the FSR and KVP (2007–2010)" for the period until 2015. The case necessary for the country's defense was not "blabbed" in the authorities, as is often the case , it received a logical continuation - the FTP was prolonged until 2015 in accordance with the decree of the government of the Russian Federation of February 2011 No. 98.

The main task of the development of the FSR and the KVP in the medium term (after 2016) and long term (after 2020) is the creation of a promising integrated dual-use radar system (IRRS DN) of the FSR and the KVP in the interests of forming a single information space about the state of the air situation for the authorities air defense management (VKO) and the EU ATM.

For the timely completion of the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP, it is necessary, first of all, not to miss the organizational and technical issues:
creation of a permanent interdepartmental working group of representatives of interested ministries and departments, scientific organizations and industrial enterprises at the IAC IVP and KVP in order to promptly resolve problem issues and prepare proposals on current issues;
preparation of proposals for the formation of a specialized department in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as the formation of a new 136 KNO FSR and KVP of the Air Force to coordinate work on improving the federal system by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Implementation of the concept in the period up to 2016 should allow:
to carry out a full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP based on the creation of fragments of the EA radar in all regions of the country and thereby provide the prerequisites for the deployment of a reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack;
to improve the quality of solving the problems of ensuring national security, defense capability and the economy of the state in the field of use and the KVP of the Russian Federation;
to bring the regulatory legal documents in the field of use and control of airspace in accordance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation, taking into account the reform of the RF Armed Forces, the creation and development of the Air Navigation System (ANS) of Russia;
ensure the implementation of a unified technical policy in the development, production, deployment, operation and application of dual-use systems and means in the field of use and KVP;
create conditions for the advanced development of domestic science and technology in the field of exploration and KVP;
to reduce the total costs of the state for the maintenance and development of the radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.

In addition, the implementation of the concept in the period up to 2016 will ensure the fulfillment of ICAO requirements for the level of air traffic safety (according to the criterion of disaster risk).

In the near future (until 2016), priority measures for the development of the SDF and KVP, except for work within the framework of the FTP "Improvement of the SDF and KVP (2007–2015)", as well as scientific and technical support for the activities of the FTP, it is advisable to carry out in the following areas :
R&D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at conducting advanced systemic research on the modernization and development of the FSR and KVP;
R&D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at the practical implementation of the main provisions of this concept in two main areas: comprehensive modernization of the EA radar and the creation of the head section of a promising IR radar station;
serial deliveries of new equipment, including dual-use, to the FSR and KVP facilities that are part of the RF Armed Forces.

FTP “Modernization of the ATM EU (2009–2015)”.

With such a distribution of activities for each area of \u200b\u200bwork, the fulfillment of its specific tasks, but interrelated with other work, is ensured, and duplication between them is excluded. In addition, it seems necessary to also organize:
introduction of new means and technologies for identification and identification of air objects, taking into account modern conditions of airspace control in peacetime;
improvement of interspecific interaction of observation and control systems of air and surface space based on the use of over-the-horizon radar (ZG radar), automatic dependent surveillance systems (ADS) and promising sources of information;
introduction of integrated digital communication systems based on advanced telecommunication technologies for the prompt and sustainable exchange of information between objects.

Solving the problem of automatic remote delivery of key information for equipment for determining nationality using the hardware and software method through the available communication channels intended for issuing radar information.

Implementation of the concept in the medium and long term (after 2016) will allow:
to achieve the strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL - to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and air defense in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) tasks, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, as well as the required level of air traffic safety in conditions of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources;
create an IRLS of the DN and form on its basis a single information space on the state of the air situation in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and other ministries and departments;
to ensure the introduction of promising means and technologies for identifying AO and automatically detecting the degree of their danger;
significantly reduce the cost of operating dual-purpose surveillance equipment and KVP due to their automatic operation.

The implementation of the concept will also contribute to the integration of the ANS of Russia into the Eurasian and world air navigation systems.

The goal of the FSR and KVP development after the completion of the main stages of development, it seems, may be the creation on the basis of EA radar of a promising IRLS of the DN, ensuring the unification of the departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the formation on this basis of a single information space on the state of the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia and other ministries and departments.

The creation of IRLS of the DN will make it possible to eliminate departmental and systemic contradictions through the introduction of basic information technologies for observation and STC, the use of modernized and promising means of radar, automation and communication, primarily dual-use, as well as the implementation of a single technical policy in the field of use and STC.

A prospective IRLS DN should include:
a network of unified dual-use information sources (UII DN), providing acquisition, preliminary processing and issuance of information about the air situation in accordance with the requirements of consumers of various departments;
a network of territorial centers for joint processing of information (TC SOI) about the air situation;
integrated digital telecommunication network (ICTS).

The main consumers of the information provided by the airborne radar station are the air defense command post (VKO) and the TC ES ATM.

IRLS DN should be built on a network principle, which will provide access to any information consumer to any AIM DN or TC SOI (subject to restrictions on access rights).

The composition of the technical means of all UII DN should be unified and include the following information, processing and communication components (modules):
primary radars (PRL);
secondary radars (SSR), providing information from the aircraft in all operating modes of request-response;
ground radar means of state identification of the EU GRLO (NRZ);
receiving devices of the ADS system;
devices for automatic processing and combining information from the above sources;
terminal devices for interfacing with an integrated digital telecommunications network in order to provide various types of communication (data, voice, video, etc.).

The means of obtaining information about the air situation (PRL, VRL, NRZ, ADS) can be integrated in various versions.

AIM DNs should be created on the basis of three types of valid dual-use information elements:
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces);
RTP DN of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces), solving the tasks of airborne flights and ensuring flights (flights) of aviation in peacetime;
RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia (EU ATM).

Moreover, in the period 2016–2020. the head section of the airborne radar station must be created in one of the regions of Russia, and subsequently the deployment of the airborne radar station must be ensured in all regions of the country. It is expedient to define the most developed fragment of the federal system in the north-west of the country as the head section of the IRRS.

Within the framework of the head section of the GU IRLS, it is necessary to use the existing systems and means of the EA radar, providing information and technical interaction of the air defense control bodies (VKO) with the ATC ES ATM, as well as to deploy promising radar, automation and communication facilities that implement new surveillance technologies and STC and ensuring the construction of UII DN and TC SOI.

Of course, it is highly desirable that the plans be fulfilled. But the question naturally arises: how effective is the reconnaissance and airspace control system as a subsystem of reconnaissance and warning of an aerospace attack of the Russian aerospace defense system?

It makes no sense today to restore the airspace radar control system that the mighty USSR once had. Air defense means of a modern level must ensure the solution of the assigned combat missions without the "pre-field" extended to the limit. As a last resort, highly mobile early warning and control equipment should work.

In his article on national security issues, published on February 20, 2012 in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vladimir Putin drew attention to the fact that in modern conditions our country cannot rely only on diplomatic and economic methods for resolving contradictions and resolving conflicts.

Russia is faced with the task of developing its military potential within the framework of the containment strategy and at the level of defense sufficiency. The Armed Forces, special services and other security agencies must be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to new challenges. This is a necessary condition for Russia to feel safe, and our country's arguments were perceived by partners in various international formats.

The joint efforts of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the military-industrial complex to improve the FSR and the airborne force will significantly increase the spatial and information capabilities of the Aerospace Defense and the Air Force.

Already today, the operational-strategic commands formed throughout the country can and should make maximum use of the spatial potential of the single radar system of the FSR and KVP. And do they actually use and how are they improving the methods of combat operations of active combat arms, having such a system?

Are the actions of the air defense on duty forces being practiced during the exercises, aimed at suppressing violations of the airspace in those regions where today the information capabilities of the information lost in 1990s radar field? Have you resolved the issues of determining the nationality of air objects according to the principle of "friend or foe"?

Probably, the widest circles of the Russian public and the country's expert community would be interested to know how effectively the created unified radar system of the FSR and KVP works within the current boundaries of responsibility for air defense. We should not be tormented today and in the historically foreseeable future by the question: is Russia threatened by radar blindness?
Sergey Vasilievich SERGEEV
deputy General Director - Head of SPKB OJSC NPO LEMZ
Alexander Evgenievich KISLUKHA
candidate of Technical Sciences, Advisor on FSR and KVP to the Deputy General Director - Head of the SPKB JSC NPO LEMZ, Colonel

of these Federal Regulations

144. Control over compliance with the requirements of these Federal Regulations is carried out by the Federal Air Transport Agency, air traffic services (flight control) in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft that violate the procedure for using the airspace (hereinafter - violating aircraft) and aircraft that violate the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. In the event that an air traffic services (flight control) body detects a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense body and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with him.

146. Air defense bodies provide radar control of the airspace and submit data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects to the relevant centers of the Unified System:

a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) are unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting the "Distress" signal;

e) flying letters "A" and "K";

f) flying for search and rescue operations.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) the use of airspace without the permission of the relevant center of the Unified System under the authorization procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) non-observance of the conditions brought by the center of the Unified System in the permit for the use of airspace;

c) failure to comply with the commands of the air traffic services (flight control) bodies and the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) non-observance of the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) failure to comply with the established time and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

e) flight of a group of aircraft in excess of the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;

g) use of the airspace of the restricted area, flight restriction area without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unplanned (undeclared) aerodrome (site), except for cases of a forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services (flight control) body;

i) non-observance by the aircraft crew of the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except in cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);

(see text in previous edition)

j) unauthorized air traffic services (flight control) aircraft deviation beyond the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, except for cases when such a deviation is due to flight safety considerations (bypassing dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) an aircraft entering the controlled airspace without the permission of the air traffic services (flight control) body;

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notification to the air traffic services unit.

148. When an intruder aircraft is identified, the air defense authorities send the "Mode" signal, which means a demand to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

The air defense bodies bring the "Mode" signal to the relevant centers of the Unified System and take action to stop the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the offending aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the "Mode" signal sent by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the violating aircraft ceases to violate the procedure for its use, shall be made by:

a) the chief of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along the routes of air traffic services;

b) chiefs of duty shifts of the regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along the air traffic service routes;

c) the operational duty officer of the air defense - in other cases.

(see text in previous edition)

150. The centers of the Unified System and the air defense bodies shall notify each other, as well as the airspace user, about the decision taken in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules.

(see text in previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, the use of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an intruder aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, the air defense bodies give a "Carpet" signal , meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the appropriate area of \u200b\u200ball aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in the fight against intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue tasks.

(see text in previous edition)

Air defense bodies bring the Carpet signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of \u200b\u200boperation of the said signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in previous edition)

The Unified System centers immediately take measures to withdraw the aircraft (their landing) from the area of \u200b\u200bthe "Carpet" signal.

(see text in previous edition)

152. In the event that the crew of the offending aircraft does not fulfill the command of the air traffic services (flight control) unit to terminate the violation of the procedure for using the airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense units. Air defense authorities apply measures to the violating aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to comply with the commands of duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which are used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

In the event that an intruder aircraft is forced to land, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing pad) suitable for the landing of this type of aircraft.

153. In the event of a threat to the safety of the flight, including those associated with an act of unlawful interference on board the aircraft, the crew gives a "Distress" signal. On aircraft equipped with a danger signaling system, in case of an attack on the crew, an additional signal "SSO" is given. Upon receipt of the "Distress" and (or) "MTR" signal from the aircraft crew, air traffic services (flight control) units are obliged to take the necessary measures to provide assistance to the crew in distress and immediately transfer to the Unified System centers, aviation search coordination centers and rescue, as well as to the air defense authorities data on his location and other necessary information.

154. After finding out the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission for the further implementation of an international flight or a flight associated with the intersection of more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified system, and in other cases - by the heads of duty shifts of the zonal center of the Unified system. systems.

It is impossible without creating an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of subdivisions and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of Russia today there are open sections of the state border and internal regions of the country.

OJSC NPP Kant, which is part of the state corporation Rostekhnologii, is conducting research and development work on the creation of a prototype of a multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, radio broadcasting and terrestrial and space-based television ( complex "Rubezh").

Today, the many times increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (SVN), and the stricter requirements of electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules do not allow in peacetime to "pollute" the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation (microwave radiation) high-potential radar stations (radar).

In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999, No. 52-FZ, emission standards have been established, which are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars is many times higher than these standards. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying, stealthy targets, which requires the consolidation of the combat formations of the radar of a traditional fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSSR).

To create a continuous 24-hour MVRLP on duty with a height of 25 meters (the height of the flight of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP will be at least 3 million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in the conditions of active use of electronic suppression (EW) by the enemy, the traditional standby locating means can be largely suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of the radar, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, as well as increase the noise immunity of the MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with an external illumination source.

For detecting air and space targets

Abroad, research is being carried out on the use of sources of external radiation in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze signals reflected from targets in TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, HF radio communications have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Their own versions of passive radars are being developed by Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, as well as the French space agency ONERA. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, Great Britain.

Similar work on target detection in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after V.I. Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving problems of semi-active location has turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibilities of using semi-active location systems with external illumination have appeared in Russia.

Developed by JSC "NPP" Kant " complex of multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system "Rubezh" designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communication) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, there is no need to spend money on the emission of its own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multichannel receiving modules (PM) are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a complex of semi-active location.

The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex allows ensuring the secrecy of these funds and using the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of the concealment coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than that of a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established limit of resource consumption. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all sources of radiation from the peace period will be disabled or disabled.

In this regard, it would be a far-sighted decision to create specialized non-directional transmitters of latent noise radiation (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

There are no analogues to the "Rubezh" complex

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the well-known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers of radio broadcasting and television. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from the targets of external illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create receiving modules compact, with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular communication masts, using the power lines of this system and without exerting any influence on its operation due to their insignificant power consumption.

Sufficiently high probabilistic characteristics of detection make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the intruder's appearance.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W or more is capable of ensuring the detection of low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1m 2 in the "clearance zone" with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of a false alarm of 10 -4 ... The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of the computing facilities.

The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, carried out by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints "and the participation of employees of the VA VKO them. G.K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target locating systems in the illumination field of BS of GSM cellular systems.

When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, the Yak-52 target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network allows to build a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and ground space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 km, along the front in a band of 200–300 km and in height up to 1500 meters.

Each detection boundary represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between BSs. The detection area is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental decision is based on the fact that with transmissive detection of a target, its effective reflecting surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect inconspicuous targets made using the "Stealth" technology.

Building up the capabilities of VKO

From the line to the line of detection, the number and direction of passing targets is being specified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmic (calculated) determination of the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the bandwidth of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is transmitted via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. The identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by the image of targets.

In this way, complex "Rubezh" will allow:

1.Create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multifrequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;

2.To provide air and ground control facilities for the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar facilities (the lower border of the controlled radar field is less than 300 meters, created only around the control centers of large airports. airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);

3.significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning in comparison with any similar systems;

4.to solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation:

- MO (building up a duty low-altitude radar field in threatened directions);

- FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space);

- ATC (control over flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small aircraft for general aviation is 20% annually);

- FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of the state border);

- Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring of fire safety, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the Russian Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

/Andrey Demidyuk, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor;
Evgeniy Demidyuk, candidate of technical sciences, vpk-news.ru/

Improving the federal system of intelligence and airspace control: history, reality, prospects

At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and means, often duplicating each other and eating up huge budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

The beginning of work on the creation of a federal system of reconnaissance and control of airspace was laid by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 1993 "On the organization of air defense in the Russian Federation", in which the now familiar name was first heard - the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The Military Scientific Committee and the Directorate of Radio Technical Troops (RTV) of the Main Command of the Air Defense Forces prepared draft reports and normative legal documents, which formed the basis for the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation in 1994 "On the creation of a federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation" and " On approval of the Regulations on the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the Federal System of Intelligence and Airspace Control of the Russian Federation. "

The FSR and KVP were assigned the following tasks:

• radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace of the Russian Federation;
• operational control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace;
• organization of interaction between control bodies of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF AF) with air traffic control bodies;
• information support for command and control systems and air traffic control bodies;
• placement of radio electronic equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of a unified technical policy.

The informational basis of the FSR and KVP was formed by the units of the air defense RTV, the air force communications and radio support troops, the naval radar surveillance, and the radar positions of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (ATM). The radar reconnaissance units of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces could be used by special order.

Thus, the unified radar system of the federal system was supposed to consist of the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as a control system, collection and processing of radar information, the basis of which was the command posts (CP) of radio engineering units and formations , reconnaissance and information centers of the command post of formations and formations (regions and zones) of the air defense.

In their development, the FSR and KVP, as its ideologists imagined, had to go through a number of stages of development, while it was necessary to maximize the potential of the radar system of the RF Armed Forces:

1st stage. Preparatory (1993).

2nd stage. Priority work on the creation of FSR and KVP (January - September 1994).

3rd stage. Deployment of the main elements of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zones (October - December 1994).

4th stage. Deployment of dual-use information elements and testing of technical means of a unified automated radar system - EA radar (1995-2001).

5th stage. Full transition to EA radar (2001-2005).

FSR and KVP took two decades to develop. Practical work on the creation of the federal system began in October 1994, when, on the instructions of the President of Russia, the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the FSR and the KVP (CMVK) began to function under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General of Aviation V.A.Prudnikov. At the origins of the creation of the federal system were professionals in their field, military and civil leaders and specialists in the field of air defense and ATC: V.A.Prudnikov, V.G. Shelkovnikov, V.P. Sinitsyn, V.F.Migunov, G.K. Dubrov, A. I. Aleshin, A. R. Balychev, J. V. Bezel, V. I. Mazov, A. S. Sumin, V. P. Zhila, V. K. Demedyuk, V. I. Ivasenko, V. I. Kozlov, S. N. Karas, V. M. Korenkov, A. E. Kislukha, B. V. Mikhailov, B. I. Kushneruk, N. F. Zobov, A. A. Koptsev, R. L. Danelov, N. N. Titarenko, A. I. Travnikov, A. I. Popov, B. V. Vasiliev, V. I. Zakharyin and others.

In the course of the first four stages, the coordination bodies of the federal system were created and began to work: CMVK FSR and KVP, six zonal interagency commissions (for air defense zones), two interdepartmental commissions - with zonal rights (in two air defense districts in the west and east of the country).

Regulatory legal documents were developed and approved governing the creation of dual-use information elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones and regions: "Regulations on dual-use units of the Russian Ministry of Defense", "Regulations on dual-use positions of the Russian Ministry of Transport", General agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia "On the creation, functioning and operation of subdivisions and positions of dual use."

Figure: 1. Assessment of the reduction in the resource consumption of radio electronic equipment of the Air Force RTV
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

As a result of this work, agreements were reached between the authorized structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport to create 30 positions and 10 dual-purpose units.

The first practical steps to create dual-use information elements of the federal system were made thanks to the perseverance and enthusiasm of the radio technical troops (RTV) specialists, who performed the functions of the CMVK apparatus, as well as the EU ATM enterprises and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC).

The experience of information interaction between military and civilian command and control bodies has shown that the use of RTV dual-purpose units in N. Chalna settlement, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Kyzyl, Kosh-Agach made it possible to reduce the economic costs of enterprises in the interests of solving the tasks of the EU ATM by at least 25-30 percent. As sources of radar information were used radar (RLK) RTV type 5N87, 1L117 and P-37.

In turn, the use of TRLK-10 and P-37 radar at dual-use positions of the North Caucasian ATC center, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Perm, Kolpashevsky ATM centers made it possible to maintain the quality of control over the use of airspace within the boundaries of responsibility for air defense in the face of reduced personnel and strength of the Air Force RTV.

However, the FSR and KVP topics, despite the very high level of documents in accordance with which it was necessary to carry out the work, were financed within the framework of the state defense order on a leftover basis. And R&D on SDF and KVP in these years were financed at the level of 15 percent of the need.

Radio altimeter PRV-13 at one of the sites of the Kapustin Yar test site. Intended to work as a means of measuring altitude as part of the 5N87 radar complex together with other rangefinders (P-37, P-35M, 5N84, 5N84A)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

As of July 1, 1997, it was not possible to conclude a single agreement (local agreement) on the creation of dual-use information elements due to the lack of real possibilities for mutual settlements between military and civilian users of radar information.

There is an urgent need to have priority funding when creating the federal system. Therefore, in December 1998, a special working group was formed from representatives of the apparatus of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Federal Aviation Service (FAS) of Russia, which prepared an analytical note on the FSR and KVP for the report to the top leadership of the country.

The note noted that the situation with the creation of the FSR and KVP poses not only a serious threat to the national security of Russia, but also is the reason for the loss of profits from possible receipts of funds to the federal budget through the FAS Russia from foreign and domestic airlines using the airspace of Russia.

It was stated that the FSR and KVP are a national treasure of Russia, one of the most important fragments of the country's unified information space. She needed to provide immediate and comprehensive government support.

Figure: 2. Indicators of increasing the area of \u200b\u200bcontrolled airspace
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

The issue was resolved at the level of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov. In the shortest possible time, the materials of the analytical note were reviewed at all levels and instructions for further actions were given. The Russian Ministry of Defense, together with the departments concerned, prepared and agreed on the draft of the necessary documents, and in August 1999, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On priority measures of state support for the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation."

The decree identified government customers and the main contractor for improving the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. The Government of the Russian Federation was instructed to ensure the development and approve in 1999 of the Federal Target Program (FTP) to improve the SDF and KVP for 2000–2010, providing for the financing of this program from the federal budget.

For several years, the draft FTP was considered, corrected, specified, reduced, supplemented, but not submitted to the government for consideration. In 2001, the Main Control Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation became interested in how the decisions on the creation of the FSR and KVP were implemented, and checked the state of affairs.

The audit showed that the government and a number of ministries (the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Finance) did not take appropriate measures to comply with the adopted normative legal acts. The state of affairs on the creation of the FSR and the KVP was recognized as unsatisfactory and not meeting the requirements of national security. It was recommended that urgent measures be taken to remedy the situation. However, even such a harsh assessment did not change the situation for the better.

At the same time, life did not stand still. Troops and enterprises for the use of airspace and air traffic control needed to be given some kind of tool for equipping dual-use information elements with dual-use route radar systems (TRLK DN).

Specialists from interested structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia prepared a draft decision on shared financing of equipping dual-use route radar positions (TRLP DN), which was submitted by the Air Force Commander-in-Chief for approval to the heads of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

PRV-13 was also used as part of the automated radio engineering units of the automated control systems 5N55M (Mezha-M), 5N53-N (Nizina-N), 5N53-U (Nizina-U) of the Luch-2 (3) system , 86Zh6 ("Field"), 5N60 ("Base") of the "Luch-4" system. PRV-13 mated with the objects of the automated control system "Air-1M", "Air-1P" (with the equipment for reading and transmitting data of the ASPD and the equipment for instrumental guidance "Kaskad-M"), with the automated control system for the air defense systems ASURK-1MA, ASURK-1P and the cabin K -9 ZRS S-200
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

The decision was approved in November 2003. Starting from 2004, financing was provided for equipping the air traffic control system on the basis of equity participation in the framework of the state defense order and the subprogram "Unified air traffic management system" of the FTP "Modernization of the transport system of Russia (2002-2010)" ...

TRLK DN "Lira-T" manufactured by JSC "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant" was identified as equipment for equipping TRLP DN. In accordance with this decision, taking into account the absence of FTP on the FSR and KVP, the work was carried out over several years. The main technical solutions for equipping the TRLK DN "Lira-T" were tested during the state tests at TRLP DN Velikiye Luki. For the period 2004-2006 more than ten TRLP DN were equipped: in 2004 - Omolon, Markovo, Keperveem, Pevek, M. Schmidt; in 2005 - Okhotsk, Okha, Nakhodka, Arkhara; in 2006 - m. Kamenny, Polyarny, Dalnerechensk, Ulan-Ude.

The work done made it possible to have 45 dual-use information elements by the end of 2006 (33 percent of the approved lists). This result was achieved to a large extent thanks to the active position of the CMVK, which in different years was headed by the current commanders-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, and since 1998 - by the Air Force.

The main burden of organizational and technical support for the creation of FSR and KVP fell on the apparatus of the CMVK, the functions of which were performed by the RTV Department. In 2003, the center of this very important work was the specially created 136th coordination and regulatory department (KNO) of the FSR and the Air Force KVP.

The management of the department was entrusted to A.E. Kislukha, who since 1994 was the executive secretary of the CMVK and led the functional direction of work on the creation of elements of the federal system in the RTV Directorate of the Main Command of the Air Defense Forces, and later in the Air Force.

The formation of the KNO, of course, removed a number of problems of coordinating the work of various departments, but the department did not solve the main task of testing technical means. Due to this and a number of other reasons, it was not possible to solve the main task of technical re-equipment with dual-use means and the transition to EA radar by 2005. The determining factor was the lack of targeted funding for research, development and serial deliveries of dual-use technical means for improving the FSR and KVP.

Only in January 2006, by an order of the government of the Russian Federation, the concept of the federal target program “Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2010” was approved, and then in June of the same year, the government of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 345 “On federal target program "Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (2007–2010)".

ST-68UM three-coordinate combat mode radar (centimeter range)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

A great deal of work on the preparation of draft documents was carried out by the leaders and specialists of the Air Force High Command: A. V. Boyarintsev, A. I. Aleshin, G. I. Nimira, A. V. Pankov, S. V. Grinko, specialists of the production and technological policy department and civilian products (PTP PGN) JSC "Concern Air Defense" Almaz-Antey ": G. P. Bendersky, A. I. Ponomarenko, E. G. Yakovlev, V. V. Khramov, O. O. Gapotchenko, heads and specialists of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation: A. V. Shramchenko, D. V. Savitsky, E. A. Voytovsky, N. N. Titarenko, N. I. Torba, A. Lomakin, as well as managers and specialists of the FSUE State ATM Corporation ": V. R. Gulchenko, V. M. Libov, K. K. Kaplya, V. V. Zakharov, K. V. Elistratov.

The concept for the development of the FSR and the KVP of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015 and beyond has determined the main directions of the organizational, military-technical and economic policy for the development of the FSR and the KVP in the interests of solving the tasks of the aerospace defense, organizing air traffic and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in airspace of the Russian Federation.

The concept reflects the agreed positions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as other interested federal executive bodies on the main directions of development and application of the FSR and KVP in peacetime.

The new stages in the development of the FSR and KVP were ideologically recognized. In its development, the FSR and KVP must go through five main stages:

• Stage I - 1994–2005;
• Stage II - 2006–2010;
• Stage III - short term (2011–2015);
• Stage IV - mid-term perspective (2016–2020);
• Stage V - long-term perspective (after 2020).

At stage I Since the creation of the FSR and the KVP, the principle of the coordinated use of radar equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia in areas of joint deployment was taken as the basis for building the federal system in accordance with the regulatory legal documents in force at that time. The implementation of this principle was achieved by centralized (unified) planning of the use of radar equipment in air defense zones (areas).

At the same time, the exchange of information on the air situation between the dual-use radio engineering units (RTP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the regional centers of the EU ATM, as well as between the dual-use radar positions (RLP DN) of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the radio engineering units of the Air Force and the Navy was carried out mainly in a manual way.

The source of funding for the work related to the creation and use of dual-use units and positions was the funds received by the Ministry of Transport of Russia at the expense of air navigation fees, as well as funds allocated by the Ministry of Defense of Russia for the construction and maintenance of the RF Armed Forces.

The lack of a mechanism for targeted financing of measures to create the FSR and the KVP did not allow organizing the use of information about the air situation from the RLP of the EU ATM located in areas where the air defense forces of the Russian Defense Ministry do not create a radar field. This factor, as well as the lack of information and technical interaction (interfacing) of the automated systems of the EU ATM and air defense bodies did not lead to a significant increase in the efficiency of the functioning of the FSR and STC.

Stage II After many years of efforts, the creation and development of the FSR and KVP finally achieved guaranteed state support for the deployment of the FSR and KVP within the framework of the FTP "Improvement of the FSR and KVP RF (2007-2010)".

Three main areas of activity were planned:

1. Comprehensive work to improve the SDF and KVP, including:

• development of project documentation for information interaction between the EU ATM centers and air defense control bodies;
• development of documentation for the reconstruction of the EU ATM centers;
• development of design documentation for the reconstruction of dual-use en-route radar positions of the EU ATM.

2. Reconstruction of the EU ATM en-route dual-use radar positions.

3. Reconstruction of ES ATM centers in terms of equipping SITV with air defense control bodies.

The main task of the FTP is to create the material and technical base of the FSR and KVP in the Central, North-Western and Eastern regions of the Russian Federation by equipping the TC of the EU ATM with information technology interaction systems (SITV) with air defense control bodies, as well as modernizing the RLP of the Ministry of Transport of Russia for their implementation functions of dual use.

The overall coordination of the activities of the FSR and the KVP at the second stage of its development was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation, formed by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2006.

The publication in 2008 of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to improve the management of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation" became a significant help in the work.

The decree legally consolidated the organizational and technical changes in the field of FSR and KVP, which actually occurred after the emergence of a new coordinating body represented by the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation (MVK IVP and KVP), and also established that the only supplier (lead executor) when placing orders for the supply of goods, performance of work, provision of services for state needs in the interests of the country's defense and the state economy in the use, reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern is OJSC.

During the implementation of the FTP, much attention was paid to the issue of creating a SITV, to achieve the efficiency of which a typical structural diagram of SITV of the EU ATM centers with control bodies and air defense command was developed. The scheme provides for the implementation of two methods for issuing information about the air situation from dual-use information elements: centralized and decentralized.

To organize the direct interaction of the EU ATM center with the air defense authorities, an interaction dispatcher is appointed from the combat crew of the duty shift of the air defense unit's command post. The workstation of the controller for interaction with the air defense units is installed in the center of the EU ATM and includes technical means for displaying radar and dispatch information and means for communication with officials of the EU ATM center and the command post of the air defense unit.

This decision has stood the test of time (1999-2005). The so-called elbow interaction of the officers of the control bodies of the air defense command post with the dispatchers was carried out directly at the centers of the EU ATM in the air defense zones. The proposed technical solutions within the framework of the FTP significantly increase the possibilities of interaction.

The technical solution to the problem of information and technical interaction is based on a set of software and hardware tools (CPTS), which allows receiving radar and scheduling information from automated air traffic control systems (ATC AS) of the EU ATM centers, as well as receiving, processing and combining radar information from TRLP LT, which are part of the EU ATM center, for subsequent transfer to the automation systems of the air defense command post.

The SITV technical means also include remote sets of subscriber equipment (VKAO), complexes for communication and air data transmission (KSSPD). The methodological apparatus for designing and evaluating FTP indicators and indicators, used in the design of FTP activities, was developed in the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the State Research Institute "Aeronavigation" and the STC "Promtekhaero".

In order to carry out the complex of works stipulated by the FTP, a cooperation of co-executors was created in JSC Concern PVO Almaz-Antey, which included more than 10 enterprises and organizations. A large amount of work in the main areas of activity was carried out by the Department of PTP PGN, MNIIPA, VNIIRA, the company "NITA", NPO "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant", STC "Promtehaero", LOTES-TM, "Radiofizika", State Research Institute "Aeronavigation", 24th NEIU and the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In order to reconstruct the TRLP DN on the basis of the requirements of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, JSC NPO Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant has specially developed and successfully passed the state tests TRLK DN "Sopka-2".

TRLK DN "Sopka-2" is designed to equip dual-purpose radar positions of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and provide radar information to the RF Armed Forces launchers involved in peacetime on air defense combat duty, to solve detection problems, measure three coordinates, estimate movement parameters, determine nationality air objects, as well as receiving additional (flight) information and receiving signals "Alarm" ("Distress") from aircraft located in its area of \u200b\u200boperation, and issuing generalized information about the air situation to display means or to the ATC AS ATM and to CP (PU) of the RF Armed Forces.

The work carried out during the II stage on the deployment of the SITV in nine centers of the EU ATM (Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadansky, Yakutsk, Rostov, St. Petersburg, Murmansk) and modernization of 46 RTLs allowed to create in the Central, Eastern and North -The western regions of the country are fragments of a unified radar system of the FSR and KVP, built on the principle of information and technical interaction between departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia.

At the same time, the exchange of information on the air situation between the ES ATM centers, equipped with SITV, and the command post of the aerospace defense brigades is carried out in an automated mode, and at most of the modernized positions, the airborne missile systems are deployed, which include the equipment for state identification of the EU GRLO and measuring the flight altitude of the observed AOs. The work carried out at the second stage to improve the FSR and KVP made it possible to increase the area of \u200b\u200bthe airspace controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (at an altitude of 1000 meters) by more than 1.7 million square meters. km, reduce the resource consumption of radio electronic equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense by almost 1.4 million hours and ensure the required level of air traffic safety by reducing the risk of accidents from 13x10 -7 to 4x10 -7.

The end follows.

Alexander KISLUKHA